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[n one-rnachine si~ctucncing situations each agent (player) has one job Lhat has to be processed on a single machine. hach job is specified by its processing time, the tirne the machine takes to handle the job. We assume that the cost of a player depends linearly on the completion time of his job. Furthermore, there is an initial order on the jobs of the agPnts heforP t.he processing of the machine starts.
Each group of agents (coalition) is allowed to obtain cost savings by rearranging their jobs in a way that is admissible with respect to the initial order. An optimal order of a coalition is an admissible rearrangement that maximizes the cost savings of this coalition. By defining the worth of a coalition as the (maximum) cost savings a coalition can make by an optimal rearrangement, we obtain a cooperative sequencing game, related to the one machine sequencing situation. This game theoretic approach has been taken in Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989) . They introduced the equal gain splitting (F;GS) rule on the class of sequencing situations. The EGS rule is ba.4ed on the fact that the optirnal order of the grand coalition can be obtained from the initial order by consecutive switching of neighbours. According to the EGS nile each agent obtains half of the gains of all neighbour switches he is actually involved in to reach an optirnal order. Note that the EGS rule is independent of the chosen optimal order and that the gain of a neighbour switch is independent of the position of the neighbours in the queue.
It was shown that each EGS allocation is in the core oí the corresponding sequencing game. Further, an axiomatic characterization of the EGS rule was provided. Curéel, Potters, Rajendra Prassad, Tijs and Veltman (1993) showed that the EGS allocation is the average of two marginal vectors of the corresponding sequencing game. Curiel, Ilamers, Potters and Tijs (199,? ~presented an alternative characterization of the EGS rule. Moreover, they introduced the head-tail core for sequencing games and showed that the corresponding EGS allocation is in the barycenter of this core. They also showed that the EGS rule can be regarded as a general nucleolus (Maschler, Potters and Tijs
(1992J).
This paper considers a generalization of the EGS rule. We study division rules for se,quencing situations where each player obtains an arbitrary non-negative part of the gains of all neighbour switches he is actually involved in to reach the optimal order.
The union of all corresponding allocations is called the split core. Obviously, the GGS allocation is an element of the split core. It is shown that the split core of a sequencing situation is a subset of the core of the corresponding sequencing ganre. Further, it is shown that the split core is the convex hull of so-called permutation based gain splitting allocations and that the correspondiug EGS allocation is the average of these vectors.
Finally, it is shown that the split core is the largest set-va,lued solution concept satisfying eHiciency, the durnmy property and a monotonicity condition.
2
Sequencing games '1'his section recalls the definitions of a sequencing game and the LGS rule.
In a one machine sequencing situation there is a queue of agents, each with one job, to be processed by one machine. The finite set of agents is denoted hy N-{1,...,n}.
The position of the agents in the queue is described by a bijection v: N--~{1,...,n}. 
A game (N,v) is called convex if for all coalitions S,T E 2N and all i E N with

S C T C N`{i} it holds thaL v(T U{i}) -v(T)~v(S U{i}} -v(S).
Cooperative game theory focuses on 'fair' and~or 'stable' division rules for the worth
v(N) of the grand coalition. A core element x -( x;);EN E RN is such that no coalition
has an incentive to split off, i.e. 
x; -v(N) and x(S) 1 v(S) for all S E 2N.
Siaapley ( The split core of a sequencing situation (N, ao, p, a) is defined by
SPC(N,oo,P,~) -{GS~(N,ao,P,a) I~E A}.
First it is shown that the split core is a subset of the core. 
PxooF: Let i E N. Then
GSi(T)(N,oO,P,o)-~gii~ii(r)f~gki(1-Aki(r)) l:oo(i)Goo(Í) k:oo(k)Gvo(i) -~gil~v(r) f~g'l~~l(r) iEP(r,i)nF(oo,i) ,jEF(T,i)nF(oo,i) f~gki(I -~ki(~)) f~gki(1 -~`ki(a)) kEP(r~i)nP(oo.i) kEl~( Td)n1'(oo~i)
-
-411h(T, L) U{d}) -v(P(T, 2)) -mi (w)
whete the third equality follows from (3).
The following tl~eorem shows Lhat the the split core is the convex hull oC all corresponding permutation based gain alloca(,ions.
Theorem 'l Lcl (N, oo,p,o) Ge a sequencing silualion.
Thr.n SPC'(N,rrwP,rs) -cusev{C.Sa(')(N,oo,P,~r)~r E [ilv}. PROOF: Let (N, w) be the switching game corresponding to (N, rro, p, a). Since (N, w)
is a convex game we have that C(w) -conv{mT(w)~r E HN}. Lemma 1 implies that
conv{mT(w)~r E TIN} -conv{GS~(T)(N,ao,p,~)~r E IIN}. Since SPC(N,oo,p,a) is a convex set we have C(w) C SPC(N, vo, p, a).
On the other hand, let a E A and let S C N. Then 8
GS; (N,QO,P,~)~~~~9ij~ij -}~9ki(1 -.`ki)ĩ ES iES jES:oo~i)~oaij) kES:oo~k)Goo~~)
-~~ii.itll(.5~.
,JEA':ao(,)C~oIJ)
In case S-N the inequality in the above calculation becomes an equality. Hence,
SPC(N, oo, p, a) C C(w). o
The next corollary follows from the proof of theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Let (N, ao, p,~) 6e a sequencing situation. Then PBGS (N, ao, p, a) is the set of all extreme points of SPC(N, Qo, p, a!).
The following theorem shows that the EGS allocation of a sequencing situation is the average of all corresponding permutation based gain splitting allocations.
Theorem 3 Let(N, oo, p,~) 6e a sequencing situation. Then
EGS(N,~o,P,~) -~GSaI')(N,ao,P,a).
n! rE~N N, oo, P, a) -((i, 8, 0 ) wherc r~-( 3, 1, 2) N,oo,p,a) -(10,4,0) where rs -(3,2, 1) and ECS(N, oo, P,~) -s~,EnN GSa(r) (N, oo,R o) -( 5, 4, 5) .
PROOF: For each r E IIN there exists a unique r`E HN such that a(r)~~(r`) -~(e) where a(e) E A with a(e);j -1 for all i, j E N,i~j. Note that the definition of a(r) implies that {r~r E HN} -{r`~r E IIN}. Since GSaI'1(N,ao,p,~) -f-GS~I'`)(N, ao, p, a) -GS~I`)(N, oo, p, a) -2ECS(N,
vo
G.S'~(")(
GSa(~)(
Note that mT~(v) -GSa(T')(N, ocr, p, o) for i E{0,'l, 3, 5} and that
ra'~(v)~CSa(T')(N,oo,p,o) for i E {1,4}. ( see figure 1)
m's(v) Tn" v) mT~v) figure 1
G'Sa(TS) G.g~('~)
In example 3 an extreme point of the core of a sequencing game coincides with an extreme point of the corresponding split core if the corresponding pernmtation is connected. IIere, a permutation r E 11N is called connected if for any i E N the set P(r,i) is a connected se~t. The next proposition shows that this property holds for any sequerrcing situation. Example 4 Consider the game of example 3. Consider~defined by a12 -1,a13 -0
Proposition 1 Let (N, oo, p,~) be a sequencing situation and (N, v) the corresponding sr.quencing game. Then rn'(v) -GSa(T)(N,ao,p,n) if r is connected.
PttooF: For any connected r E IIN we have m'(v) -m'(w)
.rnd a23 -I. Obviously a can not be constructed by means of a permutation r as in (3).
Note that GSa(N, vo, p, cr) -(4, 6, 4) is not an extreme point of SPC( N, ao, p, rz).
In the following we will give an axiomatic characterization of the split core. Let SEQ(N) represent the class of all sequencing situations with player set N. A set-valued solution concept ry assigns to each sequencing situation SEQ(N) a non-empty subset of RN. We consider the following three properties of a solution concept y.
(i) G,fftciency: Let (N,oo,p,a) E.SF'Q(N)
and let v be an optimal rearrartgement oC N.
Then for any x E ry((N, oo, p, a)) we have that~k EN xk -CN(vo) -CN(á).
(ii) Durnrny property: Let (N,oo,p,a) E SEQ(N) and let á be an opt.imal rearrange-
holds thaL ak -0. y(N, a, p, a) C SPC(N, a,p, a) for all a E EN with~Mo~C m. Let ab e such that~Moa (-m~-I . We show that y (N, ao, p, a) C SPC ( N, ao, p, a) . 
Assume that
1 havc
